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THE MOFFAT TUNNEL

ON

By Benjamin E. Sweet of the Denver Bar*

February 14, 1928, the first railroad train passed
through the Moffat Tunnel, thus marking the culmination of repeated efforts to pierce the mountain range
under James Peak and provide a more direct communication
between the eastern and western sections of Colorado. While
this completion marked the culmination of efforts to construct
the tunnel, it also inaugurated certain controversies regarding
its cost and use which have since been before the courts and
in the minds of the public and which are interesting to lawyers
and laymen alike.
In what follows an endeavor will be made to outline the
history of the tunnel and the litigation which has followed,
some of which is still pending. It must of necessity, be limited
to but the broadest aspects and most general outline and can
only dwell upon some of the high lights of the picture, at the
risk of neglecting some detail which is equally as interesting
and as important from a legal viewpoint.
The history of the tunnel may be divided into four chapters, each dealing with a 'separate and distinct attempt to construct the tunnel under some proposed scheme. The first chapter will deal with the attempt of the legislature of Colorado
in 1911 to provide for the construction of the tunnel by an
issue of state bonds, which attempt failed when the voters
to whom it was referred, declined to give their approval. The
second chapter followed in 1913, when, after the adoption of
an amendment to the Charter of the City and County of
Denver, the voters of Denver approved the issuance of city
bonds to provide the cost of construction. This chapter ends
with a determination by the Supreme Court of Colorado that
*(Editorial note: This article was prepared at the solicitation of the Editorial
Board of Dicta in response to numerous requests by members of the Bar for an article
giving a resume of the history of and litigation concerning the Moffat Tunnel.)
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the method adopted was illegal. The third chapter will deal
with a proposal made in 1919 to amend the Colorado Constitution so as to enable the state to issue its bonds in payment
of the construction cost, and ends when the voters refused their
approval of this scheme. The final chapter deals with the
present Moffat Tunnel Act passed in 1922, pursuant to which
the tunnel was finally constructed, and also embraces the litigation which followed, some of which is now pending.
FIRST CHAPTER

In an Act passed by the Colorado legislature, entitled:
"An Act to Promote and Increase the General Prosperity of
the State by Constructing a Tunnel Under and Through the
Base of James Peak, a spur of the Rocky Mountains, to be
Used for Public or Semi-Public Purposes," (S. L. 1911, chap.
221 pg. 637) the following scheme was proposed: A Tunnel
Commission was created and vested with authority to acquire
from the Denver & Northwestern Pacific Railway Co. and
the Continental Tunnel Railway Co., the then owners of the
railroad, title to the tunnel location, and to lease the tunnel,
when constructed, to the railroad for fifty years, for a rental
amounting to all interest and principal on state bonds to be
issued, plus all other incidental and necessary expenses incurred. Such lease was to be secured by collateral and a
pledge of all of the railroad's holdings and also include a
covenant by the railroad to complete its line to Salt Lake City,
Utah, via the Dotsero cutoff. The cost of construction was
expressly limited to 4 million dollars, and a state bond issue
authorized in that amount. It was contemplated the legislature might appropriate money to pay interest on the bonds
when required. A further provision was that the tunnel should
never be used for the diversion of water from the Western
Slope. The use by this railroad was not to be exclusive, but
any railroad might use the tunnel on paying its pro rata share
of rents in proportion to traffic.
In accordance with the Referendum provision embodied
in the Act, it was submitted to the electors in November, 1912,
and failed to carry by a vote of 93,183 to 47,383. Thus ended
the first chapter.

DICTA
SECOND CHAPTER

But the idea of a tunnel survived this defeat. The taxpaying electors of Denver came forward with a plan. By an
amendment to the Charter of the City and County of Denver
(Sec. 355) adopted at an election held on February 14, 1913,
a Tunnel Commission was created and instructed to determine
the feasibility of a tunnel, estimate its cost, and submit to the
voters of Denver the question of issuing city bonds and creating a general indebtedness to defray the cost of construction.
The plan outlined in the amendment was to construct a
tunnel which would also accommodate water transportation
and electric lines, the easements for which would vest perpetually in the City. It provided that a part of the funds for construction might be furnished by a private corporation.
A contract for construction of the tunnel was actually
made between the Tunnel Commission and the Denver & Salt
Lake Railroad Co. which included the following provisions:
If the tunnel was found to cost not over $4,500,000, the city
would issue and sell its bonds in payment of approximately
two-thirds of the cost, and the railroad would contribute approximately one-third, both amounts to be deposited before
construction was commenced. The city agreed to sell and
the railroad to purchase the city's interest upon repayment of
the amount of the city's investment, with interest, within a
specified time, and in the meantime to use the tunnel as part
of its railroad line and pay the interest on the city's bonds.
The railroad further agreed to complete its line to Salt Lake
City via the Dotsero cutoff within 5 years. Any other railroad
was to be permitted the use of the tunnel and the railroad
approaches to it for a distance of 30 miles to the east and 75
miles to the west, on the payment of a specified share of the
cost.
The question of issuing city bonds for this purpose was,
by Ordinance (No. 231, series 1913), submitted to the taxpaying electors of Denver, the question being: "Shall the
City and County of Denver issue bonds to an amount not
exceeding $3,000,000 for the purpose of a transportation tunnel?" On May 27, 1913, the question received an affirmative
vote and it thus appeared as though the question was settled.
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But a taxpayer of Denver objected. A suit was instituted
to enjoin the city from issuing the bonds, on the ground that
the plan was in violation of Secs. 1 and 2, Art. XI of the
Colorado Constitution. Sec. I read as follows:
"Neither the state nor any county, city, town, township or school district, shall lend or pledge the credit or faith thereof, directly or indirectly, in
any manner to, or in aid of any person, company or corporation, public or
private, for any amount or for any purpose whatever, or become responsible
for any debt, contract or liability of any person, company or corporation,
public or private, in or out of the state."

In Lord vs. Denver, 58 Colo. 1, the Colorado Supreme Court,
in reviewing the suit, held the proposed plan to be an attempt
to lend the credit of the City to a private enterprise, in violation of these constitutional provisions and, therefore, invalid.
Mr. Justice Scott, at page 18 of the opinion, makes the following comment:
"Plainly this is in violation of the constitutional provisions, in that the
city pledges its faith and credit for the benefit and use of the railroad corporation, and as plainly this is in aid of the railroad corporation."

An interesting comment on that provision of the contract
between the Commission and the Railroad whereby the Railroad was to receive a specified amount from other railroads
thereafter desiring to use the Tunnel is found at pages 23 and
24 where among other things the court says:
"In this feature alone the contract between the city and
Company, if not a grant of subsidy, is infinitely worse, for
power upon the Salt Lake Company to levy tribute upon every
company that may desire to make use of the tunnel. This is a
tion of the constitutional provision."

the Salt Lake
it confers the
other railroad
flagrant viola-

Thus by the intervention of Lord, the second attempt at
constructing the tunnel was frustrated. Thus ended the second chapter.
THIRD CHAPTER

Six years elapsed. Although the scheme proposed had
been upset by the Court, the apparent approval given the idea
of a tunnel by the voters of Denver lent encouragement to
its promoters and the third attempt was launched in 1919 by
the Twenty-second General Assembly.
This time the scheme, as finally submitted, was to embrace not one, but three separate tunnels in different parts of
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the state and was to involve an amendment to the State constitution. Under the new plan devised, the legislature (S. L.
1919, Ch. 195, pg. 669) created a State Railroad Commission
to ascertain the cost and submit to the vo*ters the question of
issuing state bonds therefor. It was provided that any lease
of the tunnel was to return a rental sufficient to pay all costs,
including principal and interest on the bonds issued. It contemplated the exercise of Eminent Domain, if necessary, to
acquire the railroad property. The Act of the legislature
apparently contemplated but one tunnel, but as the amendment was finally submitted to the voters, three separate tunnels at an estimated total cost of $18,550,000 was provided.
The addition of the two other tunnels was doubtless conceived
for the purpose of getting votes for the proposal.
The estimated cost of construction made by the Commission thus created, was $18,550.00 for the three tunnels, which
included an estimate of approximately $7,463,000 for the
construction of the Moffat Tunnel.
The Constitutional amendment submitted to the voters
on November 2, 1920, provided for the construction of these
three tunnels at the estimated cost; for a bond issue of
$18,550,000; for the perpetual ownership of the tunnels by
the State; and that no contract for construction should be let
which should create an obligation of the State in excess of
the amount to be realized from the bonds. The amendment
failed to pass by a vote of 126,099 to 101,841.
FOURTH CHAPTER

The present Moffat Tunnel Act (S. L. 1922, ch. 2, pg.
88) under the authority of which the Moffat Tunnel was
finally constructed, was passed by the Twenty-third General
Assembly, in Extraordinary Session assembled, on May 12,
1922, this session having been called by Governor Shoup to
consider legislation apropos of the Pueblo Flood and the
Moffat Tunnel.
RESUME OF THE MOFFAT TUNNEL

ACT

Sec. I declares that:
"to provide for an avenue of communication by means of a transportation tunnel through the Continental Divide at or near James Peak will reduce
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the barrier which now separates the western portions of this State from commercial intercourse with the eastern portion thereof, will facilitate communication all seasons of the year, will promote the health, comfort, safety, convenience and welfare of the people of the State of Colorado, and will be of
especial benefit to the property within the boundaries of the improvement district hereinafter created."

Sec. 2 creates an improvement district embracing the
City and County of Denver, the counties of Grand, Moffat
and Routt, and portions of the counties of Eagle, Gilpin,
Boulder, Adams and Jefferson. Sec. 3 provides that if a
remonstrance is made by the owners of 50 per cent. of the
valuation of the pxoperty in the district, the improvement
shall not be made. Sec. 4 vests management of the district
in the "Moffat Tunnel Commission", and provides for their
selection, compensation and tenure of office. Sec. 6 provides,
"it shall be the duty of the said Board on behalf of said district, to provide for the construction of and to construct a
transportation tunnel, its equipment and approaches thereto ;",
and fixes the location thereof. Sec. 7 provides for the adoption of plans and the letting of contracts and authorizes the
work to be done either by contract or by the Board. Sec. 8
empowers the Board to employ engineers, counsel and other
employees, grants power to acquire the tunnel site, confers
the power of Eminent Domain, and vests the Board, "with
all powers necessary and requisite for the accomplishment
of the purposes for which this district is organized and capable
of being delegated by the General Assembly of the State of
Colorado ;"
By Sec. 9 the Board is empowered, "to enter into a contract or contracts for the use of said tunnel * * * no such contract to be for a longer period than 99 years, and the tunnel
shall be put to the largest possible number of uses consistent
with the purposes for which such improvements are constructed. In making such contract or contracts and providing
for payments for rentals thereunder, the Board shall determine
the value of the separate and different uses to which the tunnel is to be put and shall apportion the annual rentals and
charges as nearly as possible according to the respective
values of such uses. No such contract shall be made with
any person or corporation unless and until such person or
corporation shall bind himself or itself to pay as rental there-
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for an amount determined by the Board and specified in the
contract which shall be a fair and just proportion of the total
amount required to pay interest on the bonds provided for in
this Act, plus a just proportion of the amount necessary for
their retirement and plus the cost of maintenance of the tunnel, its approaches and equipment." Monopoly of use by any
person or corporation is prohibited; other contracts for use
may be made until the capacity of the tunnel has been reached,
at which time contracts for use shall be given preference
according to their priority. Contracts may be assigned or
sub-leased and "subsequent leases or contracts for the same
use must provide for the reimbursement to the prior users of
an equitable proportionate amount theretofore paid for the
retirement of bonds, including interest thereon * * "
Sec. 10, among other things, provides: "To pay for the
construction of said tunnel, its approaches, equipment and
expenses preliminary and incidental thereto and to pay interest on bonds issued as hereinafter provided for, during the
period of construction, the Board is hereby authorized to
issue the negotiable bonds of said district in an amount not
exceeding $6,720,000 * *
Sec. 11 declares "it is hereby expressly declared that the
special benefits accruing to the real estate in said district to be
assessed are in excess of the cost of the improvements herein
provided for, and in excess of the assessments herein provided
for against said real estate." Power is granted to appraise
the benefits and to levy special assessments in proportion to
such benefits "for the purposes provided in this Act." Sec.
12 exempts public property from assessment.
Sec. 13 provides if revenues from the use of the tunnel
are insufficient to pay interest on bonds and to retire the same,
or for other necessary expenses, the Board may levy special
assessments to prevent a deficit. The procedure for assessments and for levy and collection of taxes upon the same are
provided in Sections 14 to 18 inclusive. Sec. 19 provides the
improvement district shall perpetually own the tunnel and its
appurtenances. The emergency clause appears in Sec. 20 and
the validating of any part of the Act in case any other part is
declared invalid is provided by Sec. 21.
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THE TUNNEL IS CONSTRUCTED

On May 12, 1922, upon the passage of the Moffat Tunnel
Act, "The Moffat Tunnel Improvement District" came into
being as a Quasi-Municipal Corporation, and the Tunnel
Commission appointed by the Governor went to work.
In May 1922, the Commission appraised the full value
of all real estate within the district (except that which was
exempt) at $288,443,661, and appraised the benefit which the
Commission thereupon determined would accrue to this
property by virtue of the construction of the tunnel at 15
per cent. of its appraised valuation, to-wit, $43,266,549.15.
In July 1923, believing from estimates prepared, that the
total construction cost would aggregate $6,720,000, the amount
named in Sec. 10 of the Moffat Tunnel Act, the Commission
authorized the issuance and sale of this amount of, "Moffat
Tunnel Bonds." Construction of the tunnel was commenced
in Sept. 1923, under a contract with the firm of Hitchcock
& Tinkler, contractors.
According to the first estimate made by the Commission
prior to commencing construction, it was contemplated that
the tunnel when completed would traverse approximately
1500 feet of loose earth and "squeezing ground" in constant
motion which would require additional reinforcement with
steel and concrete. This estimate, it later developed, was inaccurate. Before the tunnel was finished, over 3 miles (over
one-half the length of the tunnel) of loose earth was encountered. Realizing that funds raised from the issue of
Moffat Tunnel Bonds of 1923 would be insufficient to complete the tunnel, and estimating that approximately 3 million
dollars more would be needed, the Commission in March
1925, levied a Moffat Tunnel Fund Assessment of 3 million
dollars, plus interest, on the property within the district, and
authorized the issuance and sale of $2,500,000 of what were
termed, "Moffat Tunnel Supplemental Bonds."
On January 6, 1926, the Commission entered into a lease
for the use of the tunnel for railroad purposes. The lease,
(the terms of which will hereafter be outlined), contemplated
the completion of the tunnel by January 1, 1927, and the use
for railroad purposes by a new company to be formed, known
as, "The Denver & Salt Lake Railway Co."
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Further complications of construction were encountered
and the Commission in April 1926, estimating that $4,000,000
more would be needed, again levied a "Moffat Tunnel Fund
Supplemental Assessment" of $4,000,000 against the property
in the district, and authorized $3,500,000 of Moffat Tunnel
Supplemental Bonds to be issued and sold. The process was
again repeated in June 1927, and another "Moffat Tunnel
Supplemental Assessment" of $3,250,000 was levied and
$2,750,000 of Moffat Tunnel Supplemental Bonds were issued
and sold.
The first train of the Moffat Road passed through the
tunnel February 14, 1928, and on May 8, 1928, the Commission determined that it had spent $15,470,000 in completing
the tunnel.
Since the valuation of property within the District had,
because of improvements subsequently erected, increased, and
because property was discovered which had theretofore
escaped appraisal, the Commission thereupon made a new
and increased appraisal to accord with valuations then
existing.
SCHEDULE OF BOND ISSUES
Issue

"Moffat Tunnel"
"First Supplemental"
"Second Supplemental"
"Third Supplemental"

Dated

Maturities

Principal

1944-63
1964-73
1947-56
1974-83

$6,720,000
$2,500,000
$3,500,000
$2,750,000

July 1, 1923
March 1, 1925
April 1, 1926
June 1, 1927
Total

-

-

-

$15,470,000

LITIGATION

Milheim vs. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, et al.
72 Colo. 268; 262 U. S.710; 67 L. Ed. 1194. In September
1922, the plaintiff Milheim brought suit to enjoin the defendants from proceeding under the Moffat Tunnel Act, on the
ground that the Act was unconstitutional and burdened plaintiff's property with an illegal tax. The constitutionality of the
Act was affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court, and the
Supreme Court of the United States in the above case. Among
other things, these cases decided:
That the improvement was for a public use; that the
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legislative determination that the lands within the district
were benefited, was not subject to review; that the delegation
to the Board of tax levying powers was proper; that it was
not a lending of aid to a private corporation, such as is prohibited by the Colorado Constitution; and that it did not
violate numerous other constitutional provisions which were
cited.
The Denver Land Co. vs. The Moffat Tunnel Improve-

ment District, 87 Colo. 1. This action was brought in the
Denver District Court to enjoin the Commission from
collecting assessments for the purpose of paying the supplemental bonds and to determine under the Declaratory Judgment Act the validity of these bonds. The trial court found
the issues for the defendants. On Writ of Error the Supreme
Court reversed the judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating that the bond holders should have been made
parties defendant. Certain bondholders have now been joined
as parties defendant and the case is at this writing again before
the trial court. In view of the fact that the contentions of
the parties as shown by their briefs before the Supreme Court,
have not yet been passed upon by that court, but will likely
be again urged, they will be here briefly discussed.
THE PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS

1. Plaintiff contends that by the application of certain
legal and equitable principles, including the maxim "Expressio Unius Exclusio Alterius" Sec. 10 of the Moffat Tunnel
Act limits the cost of the tunnel and the power of the Commission to obligate the district by bonds or otherwise, to
$6,720,000. (See resume of Act, supra, for wording of Sec.
10).
2. Plaintiff further contends that the so-called "Supplemental Bonds" are bonds issued in violation of Sec. 10
and, therefore invalid; and that
3. The proceedings of the Commission and levies of
assessments made by it were limited by the issuance of
$6,720,000 of Moffat Tunnel Bonds and are, therefore irregular and insufficient to support the attempted issues of the
so-called "Suplemental Bonds."

DICTA
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTIONS

1. The defendant replies that Sec. 10 of the Act limits
only the power of the Commission to issue $6,720,000 of
"Moffat Tunnel Bonds." That the Commission by virtue of
Sec. 11, may further obligate the District, and that the limit
of such obligation is the extent of the benefits conferred by
the improvement, to-wit, $43,266,549.15. The defendant (and
certain friends of the court) argue that the legislature has
declared by Sec. 11, that the benefits are in excess of the cost,
has given the Commission power to determine the benefits
which the Commission has fixed at $43,266,549.15, and that
assessments may be levied up to that amount. The defendant
refers to the aggregate of the benefits thus appraised as a
"Reservoir of Benefits" from which the Commission may
draw funds from time to time by levies of assessments up to
the full capacity thereof.
2. The defendant further contends that the so-called
"Supplemental Bonds" are not "Bonds" of the character referred to in Sec. 10 of the Act, but are non-negotiable "Special
Obligations" in the nature of "Assignments of a Fund."
The defendant argues that the validity of the "Supplemental Bonds" and the levies of assessments to pay the same,
is predicated on a part of Sec. 11, which was not a part of
the Moffat Tunnel Act as originally drafted and introduced
before the legislature; that moreover this amendment was
made and Sec. 11 thus changed to accomplish this very purpose and to empower the Commission to obligate the District
to the full limit of the appraised benefits.
THE PLAINTIFF'S REPLY

The plaintiff answers this argument by saying that the
expression of a definite sum, "not exceeding $6,720,000", in
Sec. 10 of the Act, shows that the legislature thereby must
have intended that sum to be the limit of the District's obligation; that any such sum as 16 million dollars, the ultimate
cost, or 43 million dollars, the appraised benefit, the amount
for which the defendant contends the Commission might have
obligated the District, were not in the legislative mind when
the Act was passed; and that the expression, "not exceeding
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$6,720,000", either means a limitation of all obligation, or
it means nothing.
Numerous legal theories and principles and a volume of
precedent are cited and advanced by both sides to the controversy. The formation of any opinion upon the merits
predicated only uppn such brief statement as above, would
manifestly be unfair.
The court in the above case ordered that the funds collected from Moffat Tunnel Assessments be held in statu quo
pending the suit and enjoined their application to pay interest
on the Supplemental Bonds.
Boynton et al. vs. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District,
et al. Fed. Dist. Crt. Equity case No. 9312.
Certain bondholders instituted this action in the Federal
District Court at Denver, to compel the application of money
collected from Moffat Tunnel Assessments to pay interest on
the Supplemental Bonds and to have said bonds declared
valid. At the time this is written a motion filed by the defendants to dismiss the suit or to suspend it until the Colorado
Supreme Court has determined the case of The Denver Land
Co. vs. Moffat Tunnel Commission (supra), has been denied.
The Denver & Salt Lake Railway Co. vs. The Moffat
Tunnel Improvement District, et al. Dist. Crt. decision: 35F
(2d) 365; Cir. Crt. decision: appeals No. 260 and 261-Oct.
Term 1930.
On January 30, 1929, the Tunnel Commission served on
the railway a notice that it was in default for non-payment of
rent and that the Commission elected to forfeit the railway
lease if the amount the Commission claimed to be due was
not paid in 24 hours. The Commission claimed that the tailway was obligated to pay two-thirds of the ultimate cost of
the tunnel, $15,470,000, instead of two-thirds of $9,220,000,
the amount of the bonds then outstanding, which was the
amount set forth in the lease, and demanded an annual payment on this theory, of $850,000, instead of approximately
$355,000, which the Railway claimed it should pay. The
Railway thereupon brought this action to enjoin such forfeiture and to quiet its title to the lease. The Commission
answered that the lease was illegal and entirely void for several reasons hereinafter noted; that certain provisions, includ-
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ing the amount of rental, were illegal; that the rental was
insufficient and inequitable, and prayed that the court decree
the lease, and parts thereof void, or require the railway to pay
a rental of $850,000 per annum. The railway's replication
joined issue and pleaded estopptel. The case was thereafter
tried before the Hon. J. Foster Symes, Federal District Judge,
and a decree thereafter entered which sustained the lease in
its main provisions, but which held certain other provisions
illegal and struck them out and determined that the rental
was reasonable. (A suit previously brought in Moffat County
entitled, "Jones vs. The Moffat Tunnel Commission", which
raised many of the same contentions was removed to this court
where it is now pending (Fed. Dist. Crt., Equ. No. 8925).
Certain taxpayers were permitted to intervene and raised
substantially the same objections presented by the Commission's answer, and in addition claimed that such political and
business relations existed between certain members of the
Commission and representatives of the railway as to prevent
the Commission from properly representing the District in
the negotiations for the lease.
Both parties appealed to the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Other taxpayers and
municipalities intervened before this court and filed briefs as
amici curiae.
This litigation deals with the Moffat Tunnel Lease of
January 6, 1926, the provisions of which will now be briefly
outlined.
THE LEASE

The lease recites the issuance of $9,220,000 of tunnel
bonds; that it is estimated that the tunnel will be completed
by January 1, 1927; that the lessee has applied to rent the tunnel for railroad transportation "for the purpose of using the
same in connection with the railroad and properties of the
present The Denver & Salt Lake Railroad Co. * * *"; and
that the tunnel is hereby leased "for the term of fifty years,
together with an option to renew the same for forty-nine
years."
The railway agrees "during the time it *** may own and
operate the properties of the present The Denver & Salt Lake
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Railroad Co. and use said railroad tunnel under the terms of
this contract and indenture of lease * * *,"to pay as rental
sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. of the principal and interest
on said bonds which matures after the tunnel is completed,
and in addition to maintain the tunnel, and to pay two-thirds
of the Commission's expenses, not exceeding $18,000 annually,
and to repay to the District in annual installments beginning
in 1974, up to one million dollars, any additional indebtedness
which might be required for the completion of the railroad
tunnel.
Further provisions are included as to insurance, claims
for damages and termination in case of breach. The lease
recites that the Commission has determined the value of the
uses to be in accordance with the lease.
Should the tunnel be rendered unfit for use for thirty
days or more from unavoidable causes, the rent to be suspended, in which event the lessee will repay (up to one million
dollars) in installments, the cost to the District of repairing
the same. Lessee has the right to assign or sublease. If the
lessee is in default six months after written notice, contract
may be terminated, and if in default for one year shall be
terminated without notice. The consent of the lessee is required to any other lease of the railroad tunnel for a period
of less than ten years.
The Commission reserved the right "if the total capacity
or use of said railroad tunnel is not then being used and required by the party of the second part, to enter into a lease
or leases with the owner or owners of any other railroad for
the use of said railroad tunnel hereby leased, under the express
conditions and agreements, however, that said subsequent
leases shall never be upon more favorable rental payments
* * * than are imposed upon or given to the party of the second
part under this contract and indenture of lease."
Any junior or subsequent lessee is required as a condition precedent to leasing, to pay to the railway one-half of
any amount which it might have paid on the tunnel bonds,
and if a third lease should be made, the lessee therein shall in
like manner, reimburse the prior lessees pro rata for such
expenditures. Junior and subsequent lessees must also pay to
the railway a like proportion for betterments made subsequent

DICTA

17

to their lease and also assume and pay the bond interest which

accrues thereafter, and also to pay to the railway on the basis
of the number of cars, their proportionate share of maintenance of the tunnel.

It is further provided that all sub-

sequent leases contain these provisions.
If the Commission leases the railroad tunnel "for power
transmission, telephone and telegraph lines and other uses
contemplated by the Moffat Tunnel Law, except for trans-

portation of water", the rental to be derived is to be a credit
to the occupant of either tunnel furnishing such facilities.
A SUPPLEMENTAL LEASE providing for the in-

stallation and payment of a ventilation system, was made on
March 25, 1927.
THE CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

1.

The railway contended as follows:

(a)
That the primary purpose of the Moffat Tunnel Law was to
provide for the construction of a highway for public use and that the law
commanded the Commission to construct the tunnel.
(b) That the Commission was given authority to make this lease.
(c) That the rental or revenue to be derived firom the tunnel were
subordinate to the construction of the tunnel and its use for the public good.
(d) That the rentals were a subject of negotiation between the Commission representing the District in its proprietary capacity, and the railway;
and that they were determined upon after proper consideration by the Commission, in accordance with the formula for fixing rentals specified in the Act.

2. The Commission and certain amici curiae on the
other hand, contended:
(a) That the Act must be more strictly construed; that the leases of
the tunnel must produce sufficient revenue to defray cost of construction.
(b)
That the formula for valuing uses as prescribed in the Act was
not followed by the Commission and that the rentals fixed in the lease were
unfair and inequitable, and a fair and equitable rental should be fixed and
decreed by the court.
(c) That the entire lease is illegal and void in its entirety for the
following reasons, among others:
1. That the amount of the rentals was unfair and inequitable.
2. That the lease creates a monopoly in violation of the Act.
3. That the railroad was not bound for the term of the lease, but
might avoid obligation by forfeiting, and that the lease amounted

only to an option.
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That the lease violated Article 11, See. 2, and Article V, Sec. 25
of the Colorado Constitution prohibiting irrevocable grants.
5. That certain provisions of the lease are illegal and inseparable and
the court cannot unravel the good from the bad.
6. That the parties were mutually mistaken as to essential facts, such
as the cost of the tunnel and time of completion.
7. That the Railway was bound to know the limitations on the power
of the Commission as prescribed in the Act.
(d) That the rental fixed in the lease is unfair and inequitable and the
lease should be reformed and an adequate rental fixed by the court; that an
adequate rental is $850,000 per annum.
(e) That the lease in question was not a lease of the railroad use of
the tunnel, but was limited by the lease and the Tunnel Act to the railroad
which was purchased by the present company.
4.

3.
tions :

Certain amici curiae advanced the following proposi-

(a)
That the Act only authorizes the Commission to make "contracts for use", and there is no authority for a "contract of lease", such as
was made.
(b) That the Public Service Commission or the Interstate Commerce
Commission should determine the rental.
(c)
That the uses of the tunnel were not valued by the Commission.
(d)
That there was no valuation of telephone, telegraph, power, or
other uses.
(e) That there was no valuation of the major uses of the tunnel.
(f) That the Act contemplated a tunnel costing $6,720,000, and there
was no power to lease a $15,000,000 tunnel.

THE DECREE
1. The decree as it now stands, holds that the legislature
by adopting the Moffat Tunnel Act, created the improvement
district and commanded the Commission to construct the tunnel. "It must be remembered that the statute does not
authorize the creation of an improvement district; it creates
it. The statute does not authorize the Commission to construct a tunnel; it commands it to do so." That fifty per cent.
of the owners of the property within the District did not
remonstrate again3t the construction of the tunnel, as the Act
provided they might have done, and that considering the conditions facing the Commission which was commanded to construct the tunnel, they were justified in proceeding as they did
to incur additional obligations, and that any responsibility
for the present situation of which the Commission and amici
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curiae complain, rests with the legislature and the taxpayers
of the District who failed to remonstrate. That the Commission met the problem confronting it with fidelity, and the
exercise of sound discretion.
The decree further holds, "that in the making of such
leases the District was acting in a proprietary capacity, and
is subject to the same restrictions as a private individual."
2. The decree found against the contentions of the Commission and certain amici curiae as to the complete illegality
of the lease, for the following reasons:
That the Commission, after sufficient study, properly valued the uses
of the tunnel and recited the fact in the lease. That there was no present
prospect of leasing the tunnel for telephone, telegraph, power or other uses,
and so far as they were able to do so, the Commission took the value of these
uses into consideration. That the Commission considered items other than
the cost of the tunnel, in determining the value of the uses. That the Commission did have power to lease a $15,000,000 tunnel.
That the lease does not create a monopoly because, among other things,
the Act contemplates the making of subsequent leases and provides that such
subsequent lessees must reimburse prior lessees in certain equitable proportionate amounts. The court says:
"The law was designed to insure the largest possible use of the tunnel,
for the public good; it expressly prohibits one railroad from monopolizing the
railroad use of the tunnel; but it does not prohibit the making of a lease by
which one railroad pays for the entire railroad use of the tunnel, reserving-to
the Commission the right to make supplemental leases, if the first railroad does
not avail itself of the full railroad use of the tunnel."
That the lease does not constitute an option nor may the railway avoid
obligation by a forfeiture, but that the railway is legally bound by the lease
for the full term.
The lease, it is held, does not violate constitutional provisions against
irrevocable grants of special privileges, franchises or immunities.

Certain provisions of the lease are deemed severable, are
held to be illegal, and are stricken by the decree. It is further
held that the Moffat Tunnel Act contemplated the making of
leases and did not limit the Commission to make only "contracts for use"; that the law empowers the Tunnel Commission to fix rents and no power is, therefore, in the Interstate
Commerce Commission, or any other similar body, to do this.
"We conclude that the lease was within the power of the Commission
and was not illegal."

3.

Reformation of the lease and a substitution of another
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rental figure is denied the Commission on the ground that the
elements of reformation are not present in the suit. The court
holds that the only power which equity has to reform a contract, is to make it express the true agreement of the parties;
that there was no agreement of the parties as to any higher
or different figure of rental and that, therefore, no reformation is possible.
4. The contention of the Commission that the parties
were mutually mistaken as to items such as the cost and time
of completion of the tunnel, is ruled against and the court
holds that these were not mutual mistakes of fact, but only
"inaccurate prophesies", and holds moreover, that there was
no mistake of law.
5. The finding of the trial court, affirmed by the Circuit
Court, on the contention of certain amici curiae that certain
improper business and professional relations existed between
representatives of the railway and the Commission, was that
"both parties thereto acted in good faith without undue influence of any kind on the part of the plaintiff or its attorneys,
and said lease was not procured as a result of any personal,
business, or other relations existing between the plaintiff or
any of its representatives, and defendants or any of its members."
6. The decree further finds against the contention of
the Commission that this lease was not a lease of the railroad
use of the tunnel, but was limited to the railroad (The Denver
& Salt Lake Railroad Co.) which was purchased by the present company (The Denver & Salt Lake Railway Co.); and
holds that the entire railway use of the tunnel was leased.
7. The Federal District Court (trial court) held that
the railroad's plea of estoppel was not established. The Circuit Court does not consider this ground, in view of its decision
on other grounds.
THE DECREE STRIKING PORTIONS OF THE LEASE AS
MODIFIED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT

As heretofore stated, both sides appealed from the judgment of the District Court, the Commission appealing from
its decision that the entire lease was valid, and the railway
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appealing from its decision that certain portions of the lease
were illegal and should be stricken.
The District Court judgment struck out of the lease a
number of provisions which it held were illegal and severable.
The striking of some of these provisions was affirmed by the
Circuit Court, and the striking of others was disaffirmed.
Generally speaking, the District Court struck out all words in
the lease which might tend to make it appear to be an option
instead of a binding lease; certain clauses of the lease tending
toward monopoly; the provisions giving the railway preference
over subsequent lessees and piroviding the rentals of such subsequent lessees should go to the railway; also the provision
that no subsequent lease should be on more favorable terms;
that such subsequent lessees should reimburse the railway onehalf of any amounts which it had spent for betterments or
bond interest; also the provision that rental payments by a
subsequent lessee were a condition precedent to any valid subsequent lease; the provision abating the rent during any period
of litigation; the provision that the railway should receive
the rents from the use of the tunnel for power transmission,
telephone and telegraph lines, and other uses of the railroad
tunnel; and the provision that uses reserved by the Commission should be subordinate to the railway use.
The Circuit Court has now determined:
(a)

That the lease is a binding obligation and not an option, and that

any words which tend to make it appear to be an option are construed otherwise and need not, therefore, be stricken.
(b) That the Moffat Tunnel Act prohibits a monopoly of the use of
the tunnel, and that although the District was acting in its proprietary capacity in making the lease, the authority of its officers (the Commission) is
thus limited by the provisions of the law and all persons dealing with the
Commission are charged with notice of such limitation of powers.
"The Commission had the power to grant to one railroad company all
of the railroad use of the tunnel, as it did do; but until the total capacity of
the railroad use of the tunnel had actually been reached, it must preserve the
freedom of the District to make additional leases for railroad uses, all to
the end that the highway should be put to the greatest possible use. Any
provision of the lease which undertook to prevent the District, no matter what
the change in circumstances, from making a further lease that would avail
the public of additional use of the tunnel, is invalid. At the same time it is
the contemplation of the law, and is fair, that the revenues from such future
leases of the same use shall be paid to a prior lessee who is then paying for
an entire use of the tunnel."
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(c)
The provision that the consent of the railway is required for any
other lease of less than ten years, is held invalid.
(d)
The provision rendering subsequent leases subject to the prior
rights of the railway is held to be valid and that the railway, the first lessee
"who has contracted for the entire use of the tunnel, may not prevent other
use being made of it, which should be a prior and preferential right over a
subsequent lessee," and should, moreover, be entitled to be reimbursed by
subsequent lessees as provided in the lease "since the senior lessee has paid
for the entire use of the tunnel * * *";that subsequent lessees cannot be
required to reimburse the railway to the extent of the arbitrary figure of onehalf of the amounts which had been spent for betterments; that the provision
that a subsequent lessee pay its proportionate share of the maintenance and
operation of the tunnel, is valid.
(e)
The provision that no subsequent lease should be on more favorable
terms, and also the provision that the rents from other uses of the railroad
tunnel were to go to the railway, were both held invalid and stricken.
(f)
The following provisions stricken by the trial court were held by
the Circuit Court to be valid, and the action of the trial court in striking
them, to be error, to-wit:
The provision that the making of all payments required of subsequent
lessees should be a condition precedent to their lease; the provision abating
the rent to the railway pending any non-use because of litigation; and the
provision that incidental uses are subordinate to the railway lease.

The money judgment of the trial court against the railway for use of the tunnel from February 14 to February 28,
1928, was reversed and remanded for a determination of the
reasonable value of such use for this time, the court holding
that the basis for such claim was on a quantum meruit and
not predicated on the rentals specified in the lease.
At this writing the Commission has just announced its
decision to carry this decree of the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals to the United States Supreme Court for review.
What action that court may take remains to be seen.

DICTAPHUN
WARNING
The Grievance Committee is in session.

COMMUNITY SINGING
The District Judges will now rise and sing, "Yes, We Have No
Receivers."

MR. DOOLEY ON JUDGING JUDGES
. the judges of our Supreme Court are as fine a body of ignorant
and irritable old gentlemen as are to be found anywhere . . ." But Mr. Dooley,
our Supreme Court judges are young men.

GRANT, ELLIS, SHAFROTH & TOLL
The advertising department (828 Symes Bldg., rates on request) says
that under an arrangement effected since January DICTA (q. v.) went to
press, GRANT, ELLIS, SHAFROTH & TOLL are not only to be
mentioned but always in bold face caps. This meets, if it does not excell, the
competition of the classified section of the 'phone book. And q. v. that too.
Hearing no objections (yet) it is so ordered.

MORE ABOUT THAT POETRY
The lyrical quality of the lines addressed to the above well known and
heralded bold faced firm in January DICTA (you've got to save them so you
can q. v.) moved the erudite member of the Board of Editors to quote from
Keats as follows:
"Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter."
We should have saved that to use when the Bar Association quartet next
carols, but we needed it now. Besides, that line can be applied to the Bar
Association quartet any time. And how about this one:
"Let me sing the songs of the nation and I care not who breaks its laws."

CONTEST NEWS
The Split Infinitive Sweepstakes, it is estimated, has caused the number
of Supreme Court decisions to double. The Prize Group of the Denver Bar
Association, which is in charge of compiling returns in this notable event, has
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imported Joseph Hergesheimer's split infinitive remover to aid in its deliberations. As a result your dues will be increased to $8 and as usual your money
goes, not to employ the services of a Denver expert, but to bring in a foreigner.
Ben Stapleton, what is your answer to this? We thought so.
The Dissenting Opinion Handicap has gotten off to a disappointingly
slow start. The rule barring participation in this event by the Democratic
member of the Supreme Court is receiving thoughtful consideration.

HOUSEHOLD NOTES
Beware of The Just as Good Propaganda
Garrigues, C. J.: ". . . .While Jamaica ginger is manufactured to be
used as a medicine .... still it is .... a substitute for whiskey .... This is

done by weakening the solution with 2/3 water; the ginger is precipitated
to the bottom of the glass by weakening the solution, and the alcohol is drunk
off the top, which makes a pretty good substitute for a drink of whiskey ......
McLean v. The People, 66 Colo. 486, 488.

Add Water and Serve
Adams, J.: ". ...
Webster's International Dictionary further bears
out our impression .... Milk is not artificially prepared."
I. For other recipes see Words and Phrases, any series.

LOCAL BOY MAKES GOOD
Albert G. Craig, Denver proctor in admiralty, and prominent member
of The Guild of Former Pipe Organ Pumpers, is reported, in the Journal of
The Guild, to have invented a valve-in-head mote plucker for use on thy
brother's eye. He is licensing its use under contracts closely resembling those
employed by the United Shoe Machinery Co.

LEGISLATIVE SUPEREROGATION
"Corporations .. .formed under the provisions of this act, shall elect ...

directors ...who shall have control and management of the affairs and frauds
of the corporation . . ."

General Laws, 1877, p. 156, Sec. 227.

BASE RUMOR QUASHED
Persistent reports have reached the ears of the Editors that this column
is taken to be humorous. This is indignantly and doubtless unnecessarily
denied. The only funny thing about this column is the face of its conductor.
His photo will be furnished upon receipt of 25c in stamps and will be mailed
in a plain wrapper.
Secretly dissolved in your sweetheart's coffee, it will banish her cigarette
habit forever.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDIToR's NOTE.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

PARTITION-JUDGMENT OF THE PLEADINGS-QUIET TITLE
DECREE IMPROPER-NO. 12351-McLaughlin vs. Niles

Company-Decided December 8, 1930.
Facts.-Niles Company sued McLaughlin to partition
certain improved lots. McLaughlin filed answer denying
each and every allegation in the complaint and pleading another suit pending between the same parties and with reference to the same cause of action. Court below rendered judgment on the pleadings, quieting title but not decreeing partition.
Held.-Such denial is not a denial that defendant denies
ownership in the property but only that defendant denies the
particular ownership alleged in the complaint and it is improper to render judgment on the pleadings in such case.
While the Colorado statute gives to the court, in partition
proceedings, power to determine questions of conflicting title,
rights and interests of the parties, such determination is only
incidental to partition, and is not intended to perform the
functions of the Code action to quiet title.
Defendant should have been permitted to file an amended
answer upon his application therefor.
Judgment reversed 'with directions.
MECHANIC'S LIENSL--CESSATION OF WORK-TRIVIAL WORK-

No. 12718-The Boise-Payette Lumber Co. vs. Longwedel
et al-DecidedDecember 8, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff sought the enforcement of mechanic's
liens as against a deed of trust held by one of the defendants.
Plaintiff furnished the materials December 6, 1927, and was
assignee of one Collins, a plumber, who had practically completed his work prior to March 2, 1928, save to connect water
front in range on September 22, 1928. Both liens were filed
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November 2, 1928. The building was not actually completed
until November 1, 1928, but the owners had moved into it
some seven months before that date. All work ceased from
April 15th to July 5th of that year.
Held.-The cessation from labor came within the provisions of Sec. 6450 C. L. 1921 and the last work of the
plumber in connecting water front was "trivial". The cessation of work on April 15th must be deemed equivalent to completion. The provisions of such statute constitute a limitation
on the time for filing liens. The liens were not filed in time.
Judgment affirmed.
PRINCIPAL AND
SURETY-No.

SURETY-GENERAL

AGENT-RELEASE

OF

12153-FederalSurety Company vs. White

-Decided December 15, 1930.
Facts.-Defendant in error, plaintiff below, sued Surety
company on sub-contractor's bond for damages and recovered.
Defenses were that one Payne was a limited agent and not a
general agent and had no authority to waive certain conditions
of the bond and that surety company was released on the bond
because of certain advances made by plaintiff to the subcontractors and also because of certain acts of commission and
omission of the plaintiff and sub-contractors and that the penalty of the bond being $20,000 that no judgment in excess
thereof could be entered.
Held.-A general agent is one who is authorized to do all
acts connected with a particular trade, business or employment and Payne was such general agent; the alleged acts of
commission and omission were not sufficient to invalidate the
bond; the surety company had notice of the alleged default
and had the opportunity under the bond to take over the completion of the project but it declined this privilege and expressly disclaimed responsibility with reference thereto; while
the judgment rendered against surety company was in excess of
the penalty in the bond, such excess only consisted of interest
and it was properly allowable.
Judgment affirmed.

DICTA
ATTORNEYS-DISBARMENT-PRACTICING

WITHOUT

A

Li-

CENSE-NO. 12718-People etc. vs. Castleman-Decided

December 15, 1930.
Facts.-Castleman appeared as counsel in a case pending
in the District Court and participated in the trial without any
order of court permitting such appearance. He also used a
professional card of himself and partner advertising themselves as lawyers and giving their Denver office and phone
number. His name does not appear on the roll of attorneys
in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Held.-Respondent is guilty of practicing law in this
state without a license and without any authority and contrary
to the statutes in such case made and provided, and ordered
that he be confined in the County jail for twenty days unless
he shall sooner pay to the clerk of this Court the sum of $100.

ELECTIONS-MANDAMUS-CANVASS-CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION JUDGES-No. 12751-People etc. vs. White, et al.-

Decided December 22, 1930.
Facts.-Vernon Pfeiffer sued out an alternative writ of
mandamus wherein it was charged that the canvassing board
of Teller County failed to properly certify the vote in a certain precinct; that the certified count of the judges delivered
to the canvassing board showed that relator, Pfeiffer, had received 233 votes and his opponent for State Senator had received 188 votes and that the canvassing board unlawfully
rejected the total as certified by such board and based their
computation solely upon the tally marks which showed 221
votes for opponent and 200 for Pfeiffer.
Held.-The canvassing board had no power to reject the
totals shown in words and figures as certified by the judges of
election and compute the total number of votes cast solely upon
the tally marks appearing opposite the names of each. It was
not the purpose of the general assembly to allow mere tally
marks, which are not certified, which contain nothing more
than strokes of pen or pencil with respect to the number of
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votes cast for any candidate and which can be readily changed,
to be taken as evidence sufficient to contradict the certificate.
Judgment reversed with directions.
JUDGMENTS-

DEFAULT-

SURPRISE-

SETTING ASIDE -No.

12733-Calkins vs. Smalley-Decided December 22, 1930.
Facts.-Lower court denied motion of defendant to set
aside judgment. Defendant claimed that case stood at issue
for 17 months, when plaintiff's attorney attempted to serve
one W. M. Spaulding with trial notice which attorney refused
to accept, advising that he intended to withdraw. No other
notice was served and defendant had no notice or knowledge
that case was set for trial or that judgment had been entered
against him until after judgment. Defendant had employed
Spaulding as his regular attorney in this case and in other
matters and that Spaulding never informed him that the case
had been set for trial and that he was completely taken by
surprise.
Held.-The Court abused its discretion in not granting
the motion to vacate the judgment.
Judgment reversed.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-JUNIOR

MORTGAGE-BANKRUPTCY-

No. 12290-Johnson vs. The National Sugar Manufacturing Co. et al.-Decided, December 29, 1930.
Facts.-Johnson brought an action to recover money
judgment from The National Sugar Manufacturing Company on the theory that one, Rife, mortgaged sugar beet crop
to Johnson subject to a prior mortgage on the same crop to
National Sugar Manufacturing Company. In an action
against the mortgagor, the Sugar Company was garnished
and answered that it held the proceeds subject to Johnson's
mortgage, and Johnson demanded payment of his mortgage
from the Sugar Company. Thereafter Rife went into Bankruptcy and Johnson filed his note and chattel mortgage in the
Bankruptcy Court and thereafter withdrew the claim. Defendant pleaded proceedings in Bankruptcy Court as res
judicata, and that the lien of the chattel mortgage had expired
because not extended and that the proceeds of the crop were

DICTA

lawfully in the custody of the Bankruptcy Court. Judgment
for defendant.
Held.-(1) Junior mortgagee of the property is entitled to any part of the proceeds remaining after satisfying
prior encumbrances.
(2) The complaint was for money had and received,
and was not an action in conversion.
(3) When one who has in his possession funds which
in equity and good conscience belong to another, the law
creates a promise to pay said funds to their owner, and in
case of refusal to do so, an action in assumpsit for money had
and received is a proper action to enforce payment.
(4) After the Sugar Company had paid itself the
amount due on its prior chattel mortgage, it became as to the
surplus a holder thereof for payment to those entitled thereto,
and its position as to such surplus being analogous to that of
a trustee.
(5) The withdrawal of the plaintiff's claim from the
Bankruptcy Court, after he had appeared therein, did not
preclude him from maintaining this action.
(6) The lien of the plaintiff's chattel mortgage was in
effect, on the date of plaintiff's demand and defendant's refusal to pay, and it was at this time that plaintiff's cause of
action accrued.
Judgment reversed.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES-

No. 12684-Walker, Ray, and Halliday vs. The PeopleDecided January 5, 1931.
Facts.-Walker,Ray and Halliday were found guilty of
murder in the first degree, and the penalty was fixed at death.
The assignments of error presented: (1) The admission of
evidence of other crimes; (2)
Court's refusal to give instructions tendered by defendants.
Held.- (1) Evidence of bank robbery preceding the
murder, to shooting immediately after, and to larceny of an
automobile occurring subsequent to the murder was properly
admissible, especially in view of the fact that the defendants
had made a confession embracing these matters, which was
admitted in evidence without objection.
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(2)

Court's refusal to give instruction stating the pro-

cedure to be followed by peace officers in apprehending fugitive criminals from other states was not error.
Judgment affirmed.
ASSIGNMENT

FOR BENEFIT OF

CREDITORS-COMMON

LAW

ASSIGNMENT-No. 12676-Damaskus, et al. vs. The McCarty-Johnson Heating and Engineering Co.-Decided
January 12, 1931.
Facts.-The Betsy Ross Cafe and Candy Company made
a common law assignment, admittedly insufficient under the
statute, for the benefit of its creditors, to one Mark Harrison,
who thereupon sold the property involved, to Damaskus and
others. Subsequently thereto, the McCarty-Johnson Heating
& Enginering Company secured a judgment against the Betsy
Ross Cafe and Candy Company, and a garnishee summons
was served upon Damaskus and others, who answered that
they had no property belonging to the Betsy Ross Cafe and
Candy Company. A traverse was filed, and from a judgment
of dismissal there was an appeal to the County Court, where
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against
Damaskus and others. The Court held that the assignment
to Mark Harrison was void under the statute, and that he
took no title to the property involved.
Held.-The common law right to make an assignment
for the benefit of creditors is not abrogated by the statutory
proceeding relative to such assignment.
Judgment reversed.
CRIMINAL LAW-RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS-JOINT CHARGE

-No. 12528-Pauline Garcia vs. The People of the State
of Colorado-DecidedJanuary 12, 1931.
Facts.-Two persons were jointly charged and jointly
tried upon information charging them with feloniously receiving stolen goods. Both were convicted. The evidence
showed that only one of them directly received the goods.
Held.-1. One of the defendants' motion for separate
trial was insufficient, because it failed to set forth what the
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evidence was that that defendant claimed would be immaterial
and inadmissible against one of the defendants, although material and admissible against the other.
2. The defendant against whom the evidence is immaterial and inadmissible is the only one who can make the
motion for a separate trial.
3. To sustain a joint charge of feloniously receiving
stolen goods, there must be a joint receipt at one and the same
time; and a receipt by one of the parties at one time and place,
and a subsequent receipt by the other at another time and
place will not support the joint charge; but will only support
and justify the conviction of the one who first received them.
Judgment reversed.
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